Fighting Talk : Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy

Contents: Preface. Introduction: getting the big things right enough. I. War and peace: 1. The contexts of war are all important. 2. War is about peace, and peace can be about war. 3. It is more difficult to make peace than it is to make war. 4. War works!--but always has unintended and unanticipated consequences. 5. Peace and order are not self-enforcing, they have to be organized ad kept by somebody. 6. Not only polities, but societies and their cultures make war and peace. 7. Reason reigns over war, but passion and chance threaten to rule. 8. There is more to war than warfare. 9. Policy is king, but often is ignorant of the nature and character of war. 10. War is always a gamble. II. Strategy: 11. Knowledge of strategy is vital: the flame of strategic understanding has to be kept lit. 12. Strategy is more difficult than policy or tactics. 13. Bad strategy kills, but so also do bad policy and tactics. 14. If thucydides, sun-tzu, and Clausewitz did not say it, it probably is not worth saying. 15. The strategic "Concept du Jour" will be Tomorrow\'s stale left-over, until it is rediscovered, recycled, and revealed as a new truth. 16. The enemy too has a vote. 17. Time is the least forgiving dimension of strategy. 18. Friction is unavoidable, but need not be fatal. 19. All strategy is geostrategy: geography is fundamental. 20. Strategy is not wholly military. 21. The impossible is impossible; it is a condition, not a problem for which a solution has yet to be found. III. Military power and warfare: 22. People matter most. 23. Military power is trumps in politics. 24. Military excellence can only be verified by performance in war. 25. Military excellence cannot guarantee strategic success. 26. Victory  in battle does not ensure strategic or political success, but defeat all but guarantees failure. 27. There is more to war than firepower: the enemy is not just a target set. 28. Logistics is the arbiter of strategic opportunity. 28. Logistics is the arbiter of strategic opportunity. IV. Security and insecurity: 29. Bad times return. 30. There are always thugs, Villains, rogues, and fools out there, as well some in here, who mean us harm. 31. Superthreats do appear. 32. Prudence is the supreme virtue in statecraft and strategy. 33. Strategic history punishes good intentions. 34. Defense costs are certain, but security benefits are uncertain and arguable. 35. Arms can be controlled, but not by arms control. V. History and the future: 36. Nothing of real importance changes: modern history is not modern. 37. History can be misused to "prove" anything, but it is all that we have as a guide to the future. 38. The future is not foreseeable: nothing dates so rapidly as today\'s tomorrow. 39. Surprise is unavoidable, but its effect is not. 40. Tragedy happens. Afterword: cannon lore. Notes. Bibliography. Index.

"Gray presents an inventive treatise on the nature of strategy, war and peace, organized around forty maxims. This collection of mini-essays will forearm politicians, soldiers, and the attentive general public against many-probably most-fallacies that abound in contemporary debates about war, peace, and security. While one can never guarantee strategic success, which depends on policy, military prowess, and the quality of the dialogue between the two, a strategic education led by the judgments in these maxims increases the chances that one\'s errors will be small rather than catastrophic.

The maxims are grouped according to five clusters. "War and Peace" tackles the larger issues of strategic history that drive the demand for the services of strategic thought and practice. "Strategy" presses further, into the realm of strategic behavior, and serves as a bridge between the political focus of part one and the military concerns that follow. In "Military Power and Warfare," Gray turns to the pragmatic business of military performance: operations, tactics, and logistics. Part four, "Security and insecurity," examines why strategy is important, including a discussion of the nature, dynamic character, and functioning of world politics. Finally, "History and the Future" is meant to help strategists better understand the processes of historical change." (jacket)